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The interest in strategic alliances has increased over the years,
especially in high tech global industries such as biotechnology, as
firms seek to gain access to needed resources, expertise, and knowledge for developing and commercializing new products and technologies. The governance structure of these alliances, which is an
important consideration in understanding alliance formation and
performance, is influenced by both external and internal contexts
of the alliance partners. However, evidence from prior research
has been inconclusive regarding the impact of external contexts on
alliance governance selection. To better understand this impact, we
simultaneously examine three key partner external contexts - international, technological, and social contexts, and their influence on
biotechnology-pharmaceutical alliance governance structure selection. Using a sample of 389 alliances formed during the six-year
period 1995 through 2000, we find that the international context,
specifically national cultural distance between alliance partners,
and the social context, specifically credibility of the biotechnology
partner in the alliance network, influence governance structure
selection. We offer implications of our findings for theory, future
research, and management practice. Organization Management
Journal, 12: 110–122, 2015. doi: 10.1080/15416518.2015.1073134
Keywords national culture; social capital; technological
munificence; alliance; governance structure

Interest in strategic alliances has increased over recent
years, particularly in high-technology industries such as
biotechnology, where individual firms seldom have the all
resources, expertise, and knowledge needed to develop and market their products or technologies (Bessy & Brousseau, 1998;
Hagedoorn, 1993; Teece, 1992; Maier, Moultrie, & Clarkson,
2012; Ndofor, Sirmon, & He, 2011). Since the early 1980s, the
biotechnology industry has served as a promising new source
of pharmaceutical products that complement the chemistrybased competencies of many pharmaceutical firms (Van Brundt,
2001).
Address correspondence to Joanne L. Scillitoe, New York Institute
of Technology, P.O. Box 8000, Northern Blvd., Old Westbury, NY
11568, USA. E-mail: jscillit@nyit.edu

The biotechnology industry has seen a dramatic growth of
strategic alliances, greater than any other sector, with an annual
average growth rate of 25% (Feldman, 2001; Fisher, 1996;
Hagedoorn, 1993). Biotech firms have specialized technological expertise that is of value to the pharmaceutical industry,
and these firms often lack the resources needed for successful
commercialization of their technologies (Rebentisch & Ferretti,
1995; Dunne, Gopalakrishnan, & Scillitoe, 2009). For pharmaceutical firms, allying with a biotech firm provides an opportunity to enhance their research and development (R&D) pipeline
by complementing existing resources, skills, and knowledge
(Santoro & McGill, 2005; Mullin, 2005; Rothaermel, 2001).
Specifically, pharmaceutical firms often have resources, knowledge, and capabilities in manufacturing, regulatory, standard
of care, distribution, and marketing that can help leverage
and commercialize the biotech firm’s technological expertise
(Deeds, DeCarolis, & Coombs, 2000; Ernst & Young, 2013;
Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006).
For example, Bristol-Myers Squibb had an alliance valued at
$2 billion with ImClone to get the cancer drug Erbitux through
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approvals. Bristol-Myers
Squibb provided up-front payments and later payments to
ImClone and put one of its own senior vice-presidents in charge
of the Erbitux regulatory team (Wharton, 2002). Erbitux was
eventually approved by the FDA and had $1.87 billion in global
sales in 2013 (FiercePharma, 2014).
Another company, GlaxoSmithKline, had made licensing a critical part of its research and development strategy and preferred to buy late-stage products because of the
lower risk. When negotiating with smaller biotech firms,
GlaxoSmithkline’s resources and large sales force provided
an advantage when competing for access to promising drugs.
Corixa allied with GlaxoSmithKline for the development
and approval of Bexxar, a new cancer drug. Although the
Bexxar application was initially turned down by the FDA,
it was eventually approved (Wharton [Knowledge@Wharton],
2002). GlaxoSmithKline eventually purchased Corixa in 2005
(Seattle Times, 2005), and sales peaked for Bexxar in 2006.
GlaxoSmithKline stopped selling Bexxar in February 2014, a
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little more than a decade after it was approved by the FDA,
due to reduced usage related to a variety of industry factors
(Timmerman, 2013).
A large and growing literature focused on alliance formation and performance has investigated questions such as what
motivates firms to form an alliance (Folta, 1988; Williamson,
1985), why firms ally with one another (Al-Laham, Amburgey,
& Bates, 2008; Chung, Singh, & Lee, 2000; Coombs & Deeds,
2000; Gulati, 1995a; Zhang & Baden-Fuller, 2010), the types
of alliances formed (Ahuja, 2000; Dunne, Gopalakrishnan, &
Scillitoe, 2009; Pangarkar & Klein, 2001; Rothaermel, 2001;
Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006), and alliance success (McConnell
& Nantell, 1985; Mitchell & Singh, 1996). This research
suggests that the governance structure of alliances, specifically the presence or absence of equity involvement (Das &
Teng, 1996; Gulati, 1995a; Santoro & McGill, 2005; Osborn
& Baughn, 1990), is an important decision that can influence alliance success (Sampson, 2004) by mitigating opportunism, providing a framework for cooperation (Pangarkar &
Klein, 2001), and safeguarding intellectual assets (Li, Eden,
Hitt, & Ireland, 2008). Prior studies examining alliance governance structure have focused on internal and external factors
of the alliance partners, such as alliance objectives (Shah &
Swaminathan, 2008; Teng & Das, 2008), degree of joint collaboration (Pangarkar & Klein, 2001), cultural similarity (Gulati,
1995b; Pangarkar & Klein, 2001), alliance management experience (Al-Laham et al., 2008; Teng & Das, 2008), legitimacy
(Dacin, Oliver, & Roy, 2007), partner credibility (Dunne et al.,
2009), and international differences (Teng & Das, 2008). Thus,
previous research indicates that the choice of the governance
structure is a defining event in the alliance formation process
that can be influenced by both external and internal contexts of
the partners.
However, the body of work examining the relationship
between external context and alliance governance selection is
limited and inconclusive, requiring more research. Specifically,
Gulati (1995b), Gulati and Singh (1998), and Teng and Das
(2008) suggest that international alliances (i.e., alliances with
differences in culture and regulations) tend to result in equity
governance structures, while Pangarkar and Klein (2001) found
that national cultural differences between partners did not influence the type of governance structure selected. Meanwhile, Yiu
and Makino (2002) found that cultural differences resulted in
equity alliances rather than wholly owned subsidiaries. Thus,
more clarity is needed regarding the impact of international
context on alliance governance structure. With respect to social
contexts, Dunne et al. (2009) found that lower social capital of
a biotech firm resulted in lesser prevalence of alliance equity
structures, while the social capital of the pharmaceutical firm
had no impact on alliance governance structure. This work suggests that social context is a complex phenomenon requiring
more research. Additionally, we include the technological context as an additional external context that has received attention
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in the alliance formation literature. Specifically, prior work
suggests the local technological munificence of the biotech
firm plays an important role in the alliance formation process (Coombs, Mudambi, & Deeds, 2006). However, little is
known about the effect of technological munificence on alliance
governance structures, requiring further research.
In this study, we focus on key determinants of alliance
governance structure associated with the external context (international, social, and technical) of the biotech firm that have
been identified as important external context considerations in
alliance formation dynamics. We focus on the biotechnology
firm’s perspective for three important reasons. First, the differences in resources and capabilities of the smaller biotechnology
firm and larger pharmaceutical firm create unique and complex
dynamics. Research has demonstrated that typically the larger
pharmaceutical firms with more financial resources have greater
power in negotiating with the biotechnology firm (Lerner &
Merges, 1998), but the pharmaceutical firms must also convince biotech firms of their capabilities, particularly in clinical
development, and that they have an established worldwide
infrastructure that can support and readily distribute newly
developed drugs (Wharton, 2002).
In addition, there is considerable heterogeneity among the
biotechnology firms with respect to strength of intellectual
property possessed and stage of the technology that impacts
how the biotechnology partner will exert its influence within
the alliance. Biotechnology firms with partners significantly
larger than themselves can still have bargaining power to get
their interests met when the two parties have opposing governance interests (Bosse & Alvarez, 2010). More recent research
on co-development argues that a biotechnology firm (upstream
partner) and a pharma firm (downstream partner) often have
different objectives or goals with different challenges (Fang,
Lee, & Yang, 2015). Thus, although the objectives and insights
of both partners are important, in this study we focus on the
biotechnology firm’s perspective of alliance governance selection since the biotechnology firm often has sufficient influence
and decision-making power in the negotiation process.
Finally, in studies of biotech–pharma alliances, the
biotechnology firm has been less studied. Moreover, because
biotech firms are often resource strapped, they are at a greater
potential risk for survival. We therefore believe it is useful to
understand how biotech firms leverage their resources and position within an alliance and contend this can make a significant
contribution to the literature.
Here, we consider three key factors that constitute the environment or context of the biotechnology firm and how these
factors affect the choice of governance structure. First, we consider national cultural distance between the biotech firm and
its partner as being representative of the international context, local technological munificence of the biotech firm as the
technological context, and biotechnology firm credibility as a
part of the social context.
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Governance structure, a legal agreement between allying
firms, is an important consideration in the alliance formation
process that can impact alliance success. Alliances are subject
to opportunism costs related to partner uncertainty and a lack
of authority to ensure compliance (Parkhe, 1993; Santoro &
McGill, 2005), particularly when valuable knowledge and technology are being disclosed (Alvarez & Barney, 2001; Sampson,
2004). Selecting the appropriate governance structure can mitigate opportunism, provide a framework for cooperation (Gulati,
1995a), align incentives to encourage partner transparency and
knowledge transfer, reduce free-riding (Dyer & Singh, 1998;
Kogut, 1989), and improve managerial control (Das & Teng,
1996; Gulati, 1995a; Gopalakrishnan, Scillitoe, & Santoro,
2008; Osborn & Baughn, 1990).
Governance structures are broadly classified as the presence
or absence of equity involvement (Das & Teng, 1996; Gulati,
1995a; Osborn & Baughn, 1990). Equity alliances involve
equity commitments by each partner firm and include both
majority and minority equity arrangements (Das & Teng, 1996;
Yoshino & Rangan, 1995). Nonequity alliances are contractual arrangements that do not involve an equity commitment
by the allying partners. Nonequity arrangements are generally closer to market transactions, involving less hierarchy and
structure, whereas equity arrangements are more akin to a hierarchical form of governance (Gulati, 1998; Santoro & McGill,
2005), involving tightly coupled arrangements through formal
structures, joint ownership, and greater interdependence (Dacin
et al., 2007). Overall, studies have shown that equity structures
result in greater commitment and adaptability to changing environments, often leading to greater alliance success (Dacin et al.,
2007; Pangarkar & Klein, 2001). However, the choice of an
equity or nonequity governance structure is a complex decision
that needs to be made by the allying partners.
Biotech firms, particularly new startups, tend to have few,
if any, commercialized products or commercialization expertise
and are often dependent upon their proprietary technological
knowledge for competitive advantage (Coombs & Deeds, 1998,
2000). Biotech firms use their proprietary technological knowledge to signal the strength of their resource base to create
alliance opportunities for commercialization but are hesitant
to disclose details of this technology for fear of opportunism
(Coombs & Deeds, 2000). Conversely, pharmaceutical firms
must learn enough about the biotechnology firm to determine its
potential commercial value when leveraged with their alliance
management and downstream commercialization expertise as
part of the alliance formation decision (Coombs & Deeds, 2000;
Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006).
Equity and nonequity alliances offer positives and negatives
for both partners. Equity alliances allow the pharmaceutical firm
to have a greater financial investment (Coff, 1999), strategic
and operational control (Gulati, 1995a), and more detailed, reliable, and accurate information about the biotech firm and its
technologies (Osborn & Baughn, 1990). When taking an equity

position in a biotech firm, the pharmaceutical firm also buys
a call option for a subsequent equity purchase (Folta & Miller,
2002) or acquisition (Folta, 1988). This equity position can limit
competitors from allying with the biotech firm, protecting privileged information that could be disclosed giving competitors
an advantage. The pharmaceutical firm also better controls relational risk but can increase its performance risk (Das & Teng,
1996) since equity alliances are more difficult to terminate and
modify and are more complex and costly to manage (Buckley
& Casson, 1988; Pangarkar & Klein, 2001).
A biotech firm can benefit from an equity alliance by leveraging the commercialization and alliance management capabilities of its pharmaceutical partner (Al-Laham et al., 2008;
Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006) and by sharing the performance
risk of its technology (Das & Teng, 1996). An equity arrangement also signals to the market the potential value of the
biotech technology, increasing the biotech firm’s market valuation and ability to attract subsequent funding partners (Folta
& Janney, 2004; Janney & Folta, 2006). However, the biotech
firm loses control over its technology and, consequently, runs
the risk of reducing its future profit streams (Hitt, Ireland, &
Santoro, 2004). In nonequity arrangements, the biotech firm
retains greater control of its technology and associated profit
streams but may not gain as much commercialization help
from its pharmaceutical partner (Das & Teng, 1996). Also,
nonequity alliances can be more easily terminated than equity
alliances, thereby minimizing partner costs and alliance-specific
investments (Gulati, 1995a).
As mentioned earlier, our focus is on the biotechnology
firm’s perspective with respect to governance structure decisions within these alliances. Generally, the biotechnology firm
is smaller, has fewer resources, and has less alliance experience and capabilities than its pharmaceutical partner. Often,
in biotech–pharmaceutical firm alliances the much larger pharmaceutical firm is often the bigger winner (Alvarez & Barney,
2001), which can result in significant reduction of competitive
advantage of the biotech firm. Thus, we believe the governance
selection decision is very important for the biotechnology firm
since it needs to balance its demands for monetary and commercialization resources with its ability to remain competitive.
In this quest, the biotechnology firm desires to retain control
of its technological knowledge as much as possible and to
increase its profitability with commercialization support from
its pharmaceutical partner.

PARTNER EXTERNAL CONTEXTS AND ALLIANCE
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
Governance structure is a crucial aspect of the alliance formation process, and the alliance partners’ contexts associated
with their external environment are important considerations
in governance selection as firms seek to best manage environmental uncertainty (Pangarkar, 2007; Pangarkar & Klein,
2001). Prior research on strategic alliances suggests key external
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FIG. 1. External contexts and alliance governance.

contexts that influence alliance formation are international,
technological, and social contexts. We elaborate upon each of
these contexts next (see Figure 1).
International Context
The prevalence of international strategic alliances,
those involving partners from differing countries, continues to increase dramatically (Hagedoorn & Narula, 1996;
Gopalakrishnan et al., 2008; Pangarkar & Klein, 2001).
However, international alliances encompass greater sociocultural, political, legal, and economic complexities in comparison
to domestic alliances, and these complexities often influence
alliance governance selection (Gulati, 1995a; Gulati & Singh,
1998; Teng & Das, 2008). One key aspect of the international
context that can influence alliance governance selection is
national culture.
National culture reflects the stable, normative belief system
within a nation that influences how work is done and, in the
global marketplace, creates a simultaneous blending, battling,
and ushering in of diverse connections (Kessler & WongMingji, 2009). National culture is fostered within families,
is reinforced in institutions, and influences the organization’s
structure and its integration and adaptation to the external
environment (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1997; Hofstede, 1983).
National culture also impacts employee motivation, interactions, belief systems, and management styles in the workplace
(Gopalakrishnan & Kaur, 2009).
Although national culture is considered a stable force
within nations (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1997), it differs
widely among nations (Hofstede, 1980, 1983; House, Hanges,
Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004) and plays a role in alliance
governance selection (Pangarkar & Klein, 2001; Yiu &
Makino, 2002). Partners from more differentiated cultures
experience lower trust and coordination, greater conflict and
miscommunication, (Das, 2006), and differing frames of
reference and behavior (Kumar & Nti, 2004; Parkhe, 1991),

leading to increased costs of cooperation and the risk of alliance
dissolution or less than stellar alliance performance (Barkema
& Vermeulen, 1997). These difficulties are often magnified
within international alliances, in comparison to domestic
alliances that typically involve greater cultural homogeneity
and shared beliefs, which in turn can reduce opportunism and
transaction costs (Agarwal, 1994; Hofstede, 1996; Pangarkar &
Klein, 2001).
Das (2006) suggests that the risks of opportunism are higher
in alliances with greater national cultural distance between
partners, and therefore partners in such alliances prefer to
work within a shorter time horizon. However, the higher transaction costs and lack of trust between culturally dissimilar
partners can result in the creation of “safer” organizational
forms such as an equity alliance (Pangarkar & Klein, 2001).
This is especially salient when one of the partnering firms
(often the biotechnology firm) is smaller with lesser alliance
experience and alliance management capabilities than its partner, causing the biotech firm to rely on contractual mechanisms (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006) or equity governance
structures (Hennart, 2006). Equity structures create hierarchical
governance mechanisms that enable partners to align incentives
and develop formal mechanisms for greater cooperation, knowledge sharing, and alliance management (Osborn & Baughn,
1990; Pangarkar, 2007).
Biotech firms typically prefer to retain independence and
control over their operations and resources (Coombs & Deeds,
2000), but in light of the challenges associated with national cultural differences they are more willing to relinquish control via
an equity governance structure to ensure greater mutual success
in order to commercialize their technology. Thus, we propose:
Hypothesis 1: International alliances consisting of biotech
firms with greater national cultural differences
from the pharmaceutical firms will be positively
related to equity governance structures.
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Technological Context
The local technological context of allying partners is another
important consideration in alliance governance (Almeida, 1996;
Almeida & Kogut, 1997), including within the biotechnology
industry (Coombs et al., 2006; Decarolis & Deeds, 1999). The
local technological munificence associated with the biotech
firm, defined as the knowledge base in the biotechnology firm’s
local area, offers both alliance partners access to relevant and
new knowledge.
When firms are centered in an area with a strong supporting industry ecosystem, an environment of creativity facilitates
idea exchanges and knowledge spillovers through formal and
informal methods, fostering increased research productivity and
innovation (Coombs et al., 2006). These ideas and spillovers
tend to diffuse among local players quickly, but diffusion
to other geographic regions occurs more slowly (Almeida &
Kogut, 1997), making the association with the technologically
munificent area attractive for both partners. Alliance partners
are attracted to biotech firms in technologically munificent
locations where significant activity related to the biotech industry is ongoing and new knowledge is available (Coombs &
Deeds, 2000).
A technologically munificent local area also serves as a
bonding network that encourages cohesiveness, the pursuit
of common goals, and sharing of complex knowledge that
becomes embedded within firms over time (Adler & Kwon,
2002; Coleman, 1988; Zaheer & George, 2004). March (1981)
suggests that borrowing, not invention, is often a key driver and
catalyst for innovation. We argue that it is this frequent borrowing from geographically proximate sources that forms the basis
for new and enhanced organizational capabilities as new knowledge resulting from knowledge spillovers is absorbed into the
firm (Deeds et al., 2000; De Jong & Freel, 2010; Teece, Pisano,
& Shuen, 1997).
However, research also suggests that biotech firm innovativeness is not solely tied to one locality. Biotech firms often
seek advantages through alliances not available locally (Zaheer
& George, 2004). While bonding ties can be beneficial to gain
deep and complex knowledge through strong ties (Coleman,
1988), a sparse network with structural holes for bridging
opportunities offers the potential for new information (Burt,
1992, 1997; Zaheer & George, 2004). By reaching beyond
the local region, the biotech firm enhances its innovativeness
through more diverse and new contacts (Zaheer & George,
2004) and also gains access to regional, national, and global
markets (Birch, 2008).
The biotech firm, when located in a technology munificent
area, signals to potential partners as having access to quality
knowledge and the power to gain value from it. Both domestic and international partners seek to ally with biotech firms in
these locations (Coombs & Deeds, 2000). The biotech firm, subsequently, has greater leverage in governance structure determination. Biotech firms gain significant knowledge and alliance
partner opportunities while associated with a technological

munificent area and thus prefer to retain autonomy and control over their operations and resources (Coombs & Deeds,
2000). Also, the pharmaceutical firm may be concerned that a
biotech firm located in a technologically munificent area has
greater leverage through other partnering options and consequently may be more willing to give the biotech firm more
leeway (with a nonequity alliance) in order to access its knowledge base. With a nonequity arrangement, the biotech firm is
able to retain greater control of its technological assets yet benefit from the resources of its pharmaceutical partner to ensure
greater mutual success for commercialization of its technology.
Thus, we formally propose:
Hypothesis 2: Biotechnology firms located in more technologically munificent areas will be positively related
to the formation of nonequity alliances.

Social Context
The social context of an alliance network is also important
since interorganizational social networks are conduits of information about the credibility of an alliance partner (Al-Laham
et al., 2008; Gulati, 1999; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999).
The information is gained either directly or through trusted
informants within the alliance network regarding the reliability, integrity, and trustworthiness of the partner (Gulati, 1993;
Stuart et al., 1999; Gopalakrishnan et al., 2008), belief in partner capabilities, and partner access to other embedded actors
(Ahuja, 2000; Mizruchi, Mariolis, Schwarz, & Mintz, 1986).
In the absence of direct ties, indirect ties, such as gaining information from a trusted informant about a partner’s credibility,
can help firms protect against moral hazards, lower search and
opportunism costs (Gulati, 1999), and increase the potential
for alliance success (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Granovetter, 1985;
Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).
Often, both the pharmaceutical and biotech firms have an
alliance history that can provide information about their reputation and alliance capabilities. In this study, we focus on the
biotech firm’s alliance history, specifically credibility, and its
impact on choice of alliance governance structure. Biotech firms
with prior alliance experience and a positive reputation within
the alliance network are better able to negotiate and manage
alliances with more diverse and influential partners (Levitt &
March, 1988) and create new alliances with fewer contractual
provisions (Hitt, Ireland, Santoro, & Viney, 2004; Robinson &
Stuart, 2004).
A credible biotech firm is also more valued by pharmaceutical partners compared to a biotech firm without alliance
experience since there is a greater assurance of biotech firm
capability, technology value, and trustworthiness, thus reducing relational risk. This credibility endows the biotech firm
with leverage to create a nonequity alliance, providing it greater
safeguards to its proprietary technology and thus managing the
alliance with greater influence. Also, since the pharmaceutical
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firm may be concerned that a credible biotech firm has other
alliance partnering options, it may be more willing to yield
on its insistence for an equity stake and agree to a nonequity
arrangement. Thus:
Hypothesis 3: The credibility of the biotech firm will be positively related to the formation of nonequity
alliances.
METHOD
Sample and Data
We focus on alliances in the biotechnology industry since
the high cost of research and development, complexities of
product approval, and high rates of product failure have
stimulated the widespread use of alliances in this sector
(Gopalakrishnan et al., 2008; Hitt, Ireland, & Hoskisson, 2001;
Rothaermel, 2001). The Recombinant Capital Biotechnology
(ReCap) Database, created specifically to track alliances within
the biotechnology industry, was our principal data source to
identify alliance activity among biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms. ReCap is a California-based consulting firm
that tracks the alliances of U.S. and non-U.S. firms in the
biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries. Data was collected by ReCap from amendments to 10-K, 10-Q, S-1, and 8 K
documents, as well as material contract statements, submitted
to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
In addition, we used several other sources including www.
geert-hofstede.com for the culture measure, Coombs et al.
(2006) for the technological munificence, and Compustat.
When triangulating the data from these various independent
sources, we identified 650 alliances formed between 1995 and
2000 involving biotechnology firms. Of these 650 alliances,
389 of them had complete data relevant to this study.
We selected the years 1995–2000 for data collection for two
key reasons: data availability and the unique dynamics in the
biotechnology–pharmaceutical sectors during that time period.
The ReCap database did not have alliance formation data available prior to 1995. Regarding industry dynamics, there are two
key issues considered: a shift to federal funding, and a “new
normal” evolving from the global financial crisis. At the end
of year 2000, federal funding increased significantly for biotech
research so biotech firms had greater opportunities to gain funds
from the government beginning in the year 2001 (Industry
Studies, 2000), reducing the need for R&D alliances. However,
the global financial crisis impacted the industry in late 2008,
evolving to the current paradigm of efficiency and demonstrated
value. Efficiency is directly related to the limited financial
capital available via initial public offerings (IPOs), venture capitalists, and federal funding extended time to industry exit,
and subsequent increasing debt, particularly for small biotech
firms with precommercial technologies (Ernst & Young, 2013;
Whitehouse.gov, 2012). Demonstrated value is the expectation
driven by the evolving health care industry standard of care,
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where biotech firms must not just answer “will it work” but also
“who cares” as they progress toward commercialization. This
new normal is creating a renewed need by biotech firms to partner with pharmaceutical firms to gain needed standard-of-care
expertise and share these mounting risks toward commercialization, while pharmaceutical firms continue to seek new products for commercialization and secure acquisition options with
biotech firms (Ernst & Young, 2013).
Thus, we believe that data from 2001–2011 reflect industry dynamics that do not reflect the current paradigm and
pre-2001 data offer the best insights for unanswered alliance
governance questions, particularly for multiyear consideration.
As a result, we used the year 2000 as our cutoff to ensure
consistency within our sample and results.
MEASURES
Dependent Variable: Alliance Governance Structure
The dependent variable was the governance structure within
the alliance, where the data for this measure were collected
from the ReCap database for the period 1995–2000. Based on
Gulati and Singh (1998), alliances were coded as being either
nonequity alliances (coded 1) or equity alliances (coded 2).
Equity alliances included both majority and minority arrangements. In our sample, we found our total sample of 389 alliances
comprised of 307 nonequity alliances and 82 equity alliances.
Independent Variables
National Cultural Distance
For our measure of cultural distance, we used Hofstede’s
(1983) dimensions of national culture (power distance,
individualism–collectivism, masculinity–feminism, uncertainty
avoidance). We collected data across these four dimensions for
each nation from www.geert-hofstede.com. A composite index
of culture for each nation was created and the cultural distance
between nations based upon these indices was calculated. using
the following formula adapted from Kogut and Singh (1988):
 
  
CDj = 
Iij − Iiu /Vi /4
4

i=1

where Iij stands for the index for the ith cultural dimension and
jth country, Vi is the variance of the index of the ith dimension, u
indicates the national country of the biotech firm, and CDj is the
cultural difference of the jth country from the biotech nation.
Local Technological Munificence
This variable data was procured from Coombs and colleagues and was measured based upon the Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA) of the firm and is a factor measure
based upon five variables: grant value, number of grants, competitors, medical schools, and graduate science departments
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(Coombs et al., 2006). Grant value was measured as the total
value of National Institutes of Health (NIH) grants awarded to
universities that were among the top recipients of NIH grants
in the given year and located within the biotech firm MSA.
Number of grants was measured as the total number of NIH
grants awarded to universities who were the top 100 recipients of NIH grants in the given year and located within the
biotech firm MSA. Competitors were measured as the percentage of the total population of biotech firms operating within
the biotech firm’s MSA. Medical schools were measured as
the number of the top 100 ranked medicals schools within the
biotech firm’s MSA. Science departments were measured as
the number of universities with ranked graduate science departments in the areas biochemistry, biology, botany, chemistry, and
microbiology within the biotech firm’s MSA. A factor analysis conducted on these five contributing variables generated a
single factor explaining 80.15% of the variance (Coombs et al.,
2006). Since this measure was already used in previous studies (e.g., Coombs et al., 2006; Gopalakrishnan, Scillitoe, &
Santoro, 2008), we used this same measure in this study. The
firms in our sample were located in 21 clusters, and the clusters
with significant number of alliances were located in California,
Massachusetts, Washington state, New York and Northern New
Jersey, Philadelphia-Camden area and Houston-Sugarland area
in Texas. (see Table 1).

Biotech Credibility
Following Gulati (1993, 1999), credibility for the
biotechnology firm was measured as the total number of
alliances that a firm had with other firms prior to the formation
of the alliance under examination along with any other current
alliances the firm has with the partnering firm. The credibility
measure was calculated based on data provided by the ReCap
database for the time period January 1995 to December 2000.
Control Variables
Firm Size
We use the log of total assets of the biotechnology firm at
the time of alliance formation as a measure of firm size. Value
of total assets in dollars was collected from the Compustat
database. Due to skewness in this measure, a log transformation
was used.
Stage of Technology Development
The stage of technology development refers to the development stage of the technology associated with the alliance at
the time of alliance formation. Nine stages were identified in
the ReCap database for the development and commercialization
of technologies in the biotech–pharmaceutical alliances examined (Discovery, Lead Molecule, NDA Approved, Formulation,

TABLE 1
Sample MSA distribution
U.S. metropolitan statistical area
San Francisco–Oakland–Fremont, CA
Boston–Cambridge–Quincy, MA–NH
San Jose–Sunnyvale–Santa Clara, CA
San Diego–Carlsbad–San Marco, CA
Seattle–Tacoma–Bellevue, WA
New York–Northern New Jersey–Long Island, NY–NJ–PA
Philadelphia–Camden–Wilmington, PA–NJ–DE–MD
Trenton–Ewing, NJ
Houston–Sugar Land–Baytown, TX
Washington–Arlington–Alexandria, DC–VA–MD–WV
New Haven–Milford, CT
Portland–Vancouver–Hillsboro, OR–WA
Salt Lake City, UT
Minneapolis–St. Paul–Bloomington, MN–WI
Baltimore–Towson, MD
Boulder, CO
Miami –Fort Lauderdale–Pompano Beach, FL
Durham–Chapel Hill, NC
Los Angeles–Long Beach–Santa Ana, CA
Phoenix–Mesa–Glendale, AZ
Columbus, OH
Total alliances in sample

Number of alliances

Percent of alliances

81
51
50
36
34
28
27
15
11
9
7
7
7
6
5
4
4
3
2
1
1
389

20.82%
13.11%
12.85%
9.25%
8.74%
7.20%
6.94%
3.86%
2.83%
2.31%
1.80%
1.80%
1.80%
1.54%
1.29%
1.03%
1.03%
0.77%
0.51%
0.26%
0.26%
100.00%
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Preclinical, Phase 1, Phase 2, Phase 3, and Approved). We relied
on three additional independent sources to triangulate our
classification for technology development: (a) input from a
panel of five biotechnology and pharmaceutical experts, (b)
the Hambrecht and Quist Road Map for Investing in the Drug
Business, and (c) the stage typology proposed by Rothaermel
(2001). Using these three independent sources as our guide,
we were able to cluster the original nine stages from the
ReCap database and consolidate them into the four main stages
of Discovery, Early Clinical trials, Late Clinical trials, and
Launch. We then coded alliances in the discovery stage with
a “1,” alliances operating in the early clinical stage with a “2,”
alliances operating in the later clinical stage with a “3,” and
alliances operating in the launch stage with a “4.”

alliance formation. In Model 2 we included two geographybased variables: national cultural distance and local technological munificence. In Model 3 we added a social context variable:
biotechnology firm credibility. Our full model (Model 3) had
a chi-squared of 47.80 (p < .001) and shows a Nagelkerke
R-squared of .18. Among our control variables, firm size,
measured as the log of total assets of the biotech firm upon
alliance formation, was consistently significant across Models
1–3 (β = −0.57, −0.58, and −0.46, respectively, p < .001).
This suggests that biotech firms with more assets are more likely
to favor nonequity alliances. Stage of technology development,
our other control variable, was not significant in Models 1–3
(β = 0.16, 0.18, and 0.09 respectively, ns). For Hypothesis 1,
we argued that greater national culture distance among alliance
partners would lead to equity governance structures. We found
support for this hypothesis (β = 25.37, p < 0.05 in Model
2 and β = 23.62, p < .05 in Model 3). Hypothesis 2, which
stated that greater technological munificence of the biotech
firm’s location will lead to more nonequity alliances, was not
supported (β = 0.02, ns). We found support for Hypothesis
3 (β = −0.15, p < .01) where we posited that the greater
the credibility of the biotechnology firm, the greater would

RESULTS
Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations of the study variables. We used binary logistic regression
for hypotheses testing with three models displayed in Table 3.
Our base model (Model 1) included two control variables:
firm size and stage of technology development at the time of

TABLE 2
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix
Variables

Mean

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

Governance structure of alliance
Firm size
Stage of technology development
National cultural distance
Local technological munificence
Biotechnology firm credibility

1.21
4.83
1.58
0.01
1.24
5.34

0.41
1.39
0.90
0.01
3.71
4.04

1.00
−0.20∗∗∗
−0.06∗∗
0.13∗∗
−0.02
−0.12∗∗∗

1.00
0.07+
0.03
0.18∗∗∗
0.35∗∗∗

1.00
−0.02
−0.01
−0.10∗∗∗

1.000
0.04
−0.04

1.00
0.09∗

1.00

Note. N = 389.
+
p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001.

TABLE 3
Logistic regression of governance structure of biotech–pharma alliances

Variables
Constant
Firm size
Stage of tech development
National cultural distance
Local technological munificence
Biotechnology firm credibility
Block chi-squared
Model chi-squared
Nagelkerke R-squared

Model 1, control
variables

Model 2, geographic
context variables

Model 3, social
context variables

Std. beta
1.01+
−0.57∗∗∗
0.16

Std. beta
0.85
−0.58∗∗∗
0.18
25.37∗
0.02

31.45∗∗∗
31.45∗∗∗
0.12

6.09∗
37.53∗∗∗
0.14

Std. beta
1.10∗
−0.46∗∗∗
0.09
23.62∗
0.02
−0.15∗∗
10.27∗∗
47.80∗∗∗
0.18

Note. N = 389; nonequity alliances = 307 and equity alliances = 82.
+
p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001.
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be the likelihood of nonequity alliances. Overall, our results
provide support for two of our three hypotheses and suggest
both social and international contexts play a role in the alliance
governancebr decision.

DISCUSSION
Previous research on the role of the external environment
of alliance partners on alliance governance has offered limited and sometimes conflicting evidence. Our study contributes
to this literature in several ways. First, we offer a more
in-depth consideration of external context factors that influence
alliance governance selection by clearly identifying and testing
key contextual factors associated with international alliances,
addressing conflicting insights from past research on the role
of national culture, and providing new consideration of technological munificence on alliance governance. Second, we offer
support to prior findings regarding the role of biotech firm
credibility in alliance governance selection. Finally, we simultaneously focus on all key elements of the external context to offer
a holistic insight of this context on alliance governance. This is a
notable addition to the literature, since prior studies considered
only pieces of this context without offering a more comprehensive understanding of their simultaneous influence and effect on
alliance dynamics.
Our control variable findings show that biotech firms with
greater assets, particularly financial assets, are more likely to
secure a nonequity alliance governance structure. This finding is consistent with the notion that a biotech firm that has
more resources available will prefer to leverage those resources
and seek to retain control of its technology through nonequity
arrangements. A biotech firm with more resources will have
lesser need for external funding from current or future partners
and will have less concern with survival, placing it in a better
negotiating position.
Regarding our hypotheses, we posited within the international context that greater national cultural distance would result
in equity alliances due to the increased complexities resulting
in greater perceived mistrust and opportunism associated with
more distant cultures. Our results support this argument. This
finding appears to contradict some past research that suggested
there was no relationship between national cultural distance
and alliance governance choice (see Pangarkar & Klein, 2001)
but is consistent with Yiu and Makino (2002), who found that
national culture invites equity alliances over acquisition, and
Gulati (1995b), who found that greater national cultural distance resulted in equity alliances. Perhaps our findings differ
from Pangarkar and Klein’s (2001) study since their sample
included mostly R&D alliances and also included joint ventures in their sample. R&D alliances tend to be formed as equity
arrangements (Gulati, 1995b), and this could overshadow other
governance considerations. Gulati (1995b), in contrast, controlled for R&D alliances and found that national culture distance influenced governance in the form of equity arrangements.

The dynamic between pharmaceutical and biotech firms is often
based upon commercialization activities. In addition, joint ventures were not included in our study. Thus, it is possible that
although Pangarkar and Klein (2001) suggest that the impact
of cultural distance in the alliance formation process is overestimated, our findings and analysis of prior research suggest
the focus of the alliance plays a significant role in the governance decision. For R&D activities, particularly in the context
of joint ventures, scientists and technologists may have a greater
opportunity to work together and develop personal relationships and trust that can lead to cultural understanding that
may be less present in alliances focused on commercialization activities, such as biotech–pharmaceutical alliances that
are linked forms with limited competency overlap (Pangarkar,
2007; Reuer, Zollo, & Singh, 2002). Differences in national
cultures significantly influence the risks of opportunism and
transaction costs when there is no prior relationship, and we
surmise that equity structures can mitigate these perceived risks
and costs. Thus, this premise highlights the probable role of
relationship dynamics in the alliance formation and governance
selection process. Further investigation into these dynamics is
needed but beyond the scope of this study.
We also considered the technological munificence of the
biotechnology firm that can influence alliance governance structure choice, a new consideration to this literature. While past
research suggests that technological munificence, or technological hot spots, offer valuable benefits to affiliated firms
such as knowledge spillovers, labor mobility, and informal and
formal interactions that enable knowledge exchange (Coombs
et al., 2006), our findings suggest biotech local technological
munificence does not influence the choice of alliance governance structure. Biotech firms often locate in hot spots to gain
knowledge benefits and to improve their access to technology
personnel and R&D. Consequently, pharmaceutical partners can
use these locations to identify quality biotech firms that they
could partner with. While alliances with biotech firms in certain
hot spots are desirable and can result in increased financial capital gained from international partners (Coombs & Deeds, 2000),
there does not appear to be a significant link to the choice of
governance structure of these alliances, since more than 90% of
firms are located in clusters and there is limited variability in
the measure. We surmise technological munificence only influences the determination of choosing an alliance partner, not the
more micro issue of alliance governance.
Finally, our results also contribute to the social capital
alliance literature by suggesting that, despite having less financial, physical, or human resources, credible biotech firms in
the alliance network can engage in nonequity arrangements
due to their reputational power and influence. For example,
Al-Laham et al. (2008) found that general alliance experience
affects the speed at which firms enter into alliances. Hoang
and Rothaermel (2005) suggest that biotech firm credibility
was an indicator of alliance success, while Dunne et al. (2009)
found that biotech firm credibility resulted in the formation of
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nonequity alliance governance structures. Our study extends
these earlier works by further punctuating that alliance experience for the biotechnology firm confers leverage and credibility
in the marketplace, which enables them to better negotiate with
the pharmaceutical firm when structuring an alliance. We suspect that credible biotech firms are able to court the interests
of several pharmaceutical firms simultaneously, further improving their leverage and even delaying alliance formation with the
courting partners to find the best arrangement. Our study builds
from prior research strengthening the assertion that previous
alliance experience may be important in many aspects related
to alliance formation, structuring, and management.
Managerial Implications
Our findings have implications for both biotech and pharmaceutical managers, suggesting that the type of alliance governance structure chosen is contingent upon international and
social contexts of the external environment, providing management with clearer mechanisms useful for facilitating various
alliance activities and outcomes.
A biotech firm may be better off expending time and
resources seeking domestic pharmaceutical partners instead of
international partners when desiring a nonequity alliance—
understanding that an equity alliance would be the more likely
outcome due to cultural differences that increase the perception of mistrust and opportunism. However, a biotech firm can
leverage its reputation and clout within the alliance network as
a credible potential partner to seek its desired terms, particularly a nonequity alliance, to retain greater control and profits
associated with its technology.
Although this study is focused on the biotechnology firm
partner, managerial implications can be found for the pharmaceutical firm as well. If a pharmaceutical firm desires a
nonequity arrangement, governance that reduces its risk associated with a biotech’s developing technology, it may focus
its resources to identify a domestic biotech firm. Also, as
another strategy to identify a partner for a nonequity alliance,
a pharmaceutical firm may seek a biotech firm with a stronger
alliance reputation where it can be more assured of the technological capabilities and trustworthiness of the partner. The
technological munificence of the area of the biotech firm does
not appear to influence governance structure. We know there
can be disagreements and differing motivations that drive the
choice of governance structure that go beyond the initial strategic objectives and external contextual considerations for an
alliance. Our study offers a piece of the larger contingency
perspective to governance choice where managers can consider a portfolio approach to alliances and alliance management,
since a large number of alliances with different partners confronting different conditions may require a combination of
both more or less hierarchical forms of control that often
necessitate different alliance management skills, expertise, and
backgrounds.
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Limitations and Additional Suggestions for Future
Research
Despite our contributions, there are limitations to this study.
First, although we used several independent data sources, we
relied solely on secondary data. While our focus on SEC
filing firms offers a fairly comprehensive examination of
biotech-pharmaceutical alliance dynamics, we did not include
privately held, non-SEC filing firms in our sample since the
availability of alliance formation and performance data of these
firms is limited. Although research on these privately held
firms is challenging, pursuing this line of inquiry could provide
additional insights.
Second, demarcating the alliance formation process and
consideration of the various factors influencing various stages
of this process and their interactions would provide a clearer
picture on alliance formation issues. For example, determining
who to ally with and the up-front financial payments made
to a biotech firm by the pharmaceutical firm partner could be
further explored within the context of governance choice and
the contingencies we propose here. Examining the extent of
financial capital and the status gained through allying with
a credible partner or with a firm in a locally technological
munificent area could disclose additional forces that influence
alliance formation.
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